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Abstract
This paper uses data from retail industries in Chile to test
Shaked and Suttons (1987) hypothesis of endogenous sunk costs.
I nd that industries which are less likely to have endogenous sunk
costs display a signicant negative relationship between market
size and concentration. In contrast, in the supermarket industry,
where investment in advertising is presumed to be more intense,
the tests show that concentration does not vary with market size
and is bounded away from zero.
1 Testing for Endogenous Sunk Costs in the Retail
Industry: The Chilean Case
1.1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to test the hypothesis of endogenous sunk costs
proposed by Shaked and Sutton (1987) and Sutton (1991). The main
implication of Suttons model is that one observes large markets with
only a few large rms instead of a large number of rms. Many theories of
oligopolistic competition predict, on the contrary, that when the market
increases in size more rms enter and thus concentration decreases. The
novelty of Suttons result relies on the presence of endogenous sunk costs.
There are some papers that have empirically tested Suttons theory.
Sutton himself did it for twenty narrowly dened food and drink indus-
tries across six developed countries (Sutton, 1991). Also, Robinson and
Chiang (1996) analyze a cross-section of consumer and industrial goods
manufacturing businesses in some of the largest markets in the US nd-
ing that most results are robust to Suttons theory. More recently, Berry
and Waldfogel (2003) test the theory for restaurants and newspapers,
and Bronnenberg, Dhar and Dubé (2005) for consumer package goods
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industries using a database of 31 industries located in the 50 largest US
metropolitan markets. Both papers nd support for Suttons theory.
Finally, Dick (2007) runs the tests for the banking industry and Ellick-
son (2007) studies the theory for supermarkets and beauty salons for 51
distinct geographic markets in the US, being the rst work of this kind
to be focused on the retail industry.
This paper is a contribution to the empirical work that focuses on
retail markets, being the rst one to use panel data. Furthermore, it is
one of the very few that tests the theory for industries in a developing
country. The only other study I have knowledge of is Rosende (2008)
who tested the theory for the Brazilian manufacturing industry in 2005,
nding no evidence of endogenous sunk costs.
Suttons idea is simple, and based on a 2-stage game. At stage 1 of
the game, a rm decides how much to spend in advertising (or R&D),
assuming that it is possible to enhance consumerswillingness-to-pay
for a given product to some minimal degree by way of a proportionate
increase in xed cost (with either no increase or only a small increase in
unit variable cost). At stage 2, rms compete on prices. The di¤erence
with respect to the case of exogenous sunk costs is that in this case,
the decision of a rm about incurring a greater advertising (or R&D)
expenditure at stage 1 enhances the demand for its product at stage
2. Then, the game played at stage 1 might involve some escalation of
the advertising outlays that leaves only a few rms able to compete in
the second stage. Therefore, at the end of the game, an equilibrium
is achieved where few rms compete in the second stage, all of which
incurred fairly high (endogenous) sunk costs, and where this structure
remains no matter how large the market becomes.
In order to test the theory I use annual data for local markets (comu-
nas)1 for the retail industry in Chile, from 1994 to 2000. To maximize
the probability of dening a local market through a comuna, I focus on
industries that are present in at least 60% of the comunas and for which
customers primarily belong to the same comuna where the rm oper-
ates. This is most likely to happen within the retail industry especially
if I focus on markets that are non-metropolitan. Also, I chose retail
industries in non-metropolitan areas to minimize the problem of dealing
with rms that have more than one establishment in that area.
I estimate lower bounds for concentration and also run a linear panel
data (random e¤ect) regression with a concentration index as the de-
pendent variable. The key independent variable is a measure of market
size. I also include a set of control variables that takes into account the
1A comuna is comparable to a county. It is the denition of local market we use
throughout the paper.
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socioeconomic di¤erences among comunas. For most industries, the
results show a signicant negative relationship between market size and
concentration. I also nd that this e¤ect is stronger in industries that I
presume make little investment in the rst stage of the game, replicating
the results found in the literature for most oligopoly markets. Neverthe-
less, there is one industry, supermarkets, where I nd that the elasticity
of concentration with respect to the market size is not statistically dif-
ferent from zero for some of the specications, replicating the results
predicted by Suttons model.
2 Related Papers
Although most of this paper is based in Sutton (1991) there are three
other studies that are closely related. The rst one is Campbell and
Hopenhayn (2005), where two approaches are empirically contrasted to
modeling competition among a large number of producers. One approach
is monopolistic competition, in which the distribution of producers ac-
tions, prots and sizes are invariant to the number of consumers. The
second approach is oligopolistic competition in which producers size in-
creases as the number of consumers increases. In particular, the latter
implies that larger markets present tougher competition as implied by
lower markups. Using data for 13 retail trade industries with an impor-
tant presence in 225 Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the United States,
the authors compare producers size across large and small markets and
nd evidence that supports the oligopolistic approach. The results are
robust to di¤erent measures of producers size, market size and to di¤er-
ent estimation techniques, as well as being robust to the use of di¤erent
control variables and sample sizes. Most of the data was obtained from
the 1992 Census of Retail Trade and the 1992 County Business Patterns.
The second related paper is that of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991),
where they propose to measure how fast price-cost margins fall in com-
petition, especially in concentrated markets. They use data of geograph-
ically isolated monopolies and oligopolies and study the relationship be-
tween the number of rms in a market, the size of the market, and com-
petition. The results suggest that competitive conduct changes quickly
as the number of incumbents increases. Surprisingly, when there are 1
or 2 rms in the market the addition of an extra one makes the price
go down. Nevertheless, once the market has between 3 and 5 rms, the
next entrant has little e¤ect on competitive conduct. They use a model
of entry for situations in which one does not observe incumbents or
entrantsprice-cost margins. They observe 202 markets that di¤er pri-
marily in the number of local residents, and they estimate probit models
of the equilibrium number of markets. Structural shifts in these models
3
allow for the estimation of the e¤ect of entry on rm prots. This paper
is related to mine in that it intends to explain the features of oligopolis-
tic markets and that the sample is composed by small geographically
isolated markets. However it departs from mine in the use of a more
structural model and in that it is focused particularly on concentrated
markets.
The last related paper is Ellickson (2007). He tests the hypothesis
of endogenous sunk costs for supermarkets in the US adapting Suttons
(1991) model of advertising to include some specic features of the su-
permarket competition. In particular, he assumes that supermarkets
compete for customers by o¤ering a greater variety of products. To be
able to o¤er a large variety of products a rm needs to have invested in
a large portion of land and in an advanced distribution systems. Firms
that fail to match these variety increases cannot survive, so as markets
grow, rms need to incur higher costs to stay in business, and this es-
calation of costs will prevent other rms from entering the market. He
uses data from the Trade Dimensions Tenant Database for 1998, con-
taining supermarkets with at least $2 million in yearly revenues in 51
US markets, dening the distribution areas as those using the observed
networks of stores and warehouses. Ellickson estimates lower bounds of
concentration showing that the supermarket industry does not fragment
as market size increases. He also contrasts these results with an esti-
mation of lower bounds for barber shops and beauty salons (clearly an
exogenous cost industry). In this case the lower bound of concentration
decreases monotonically to zero.
3 Data
The dataset used in this paper consists of the universe of rms competing
in di¤erent economic sectors in the Chilean economy. By universe of
rms I mean that for each year I observe practically all the rms in
the formal sector that were economically active. The period covered is
1994-2000, that is, I have information for 7 years. The data was gathered
by the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (SII from its name in Spanish)
directly from the rms by means of their tax forms. For each observation
(each rm) I have the following information:
1. ID: Unique identication number that allows one to track each rm
throughout the years.
2. Economic Sector: International Uniform Industrial Classication
(CIIU) with 5 digits. Hence one can di¤erentiate more than 580
di¤erent sectors.2
2For this particular project we work with 17 di¤erent retail or services industries
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3. Geographic location (comuna): Each rm is located in one of 341
municipalities, or local governments.
4. Sales: Each rm is classied into one of 13 tiers. This is enough
to approximate the size of the rm.
The period 1994-2000, is characterized in general terms by the reestab-
lishment of democracy and the consolidation of the internationalization
of the Chilean economy. The average growth rate of real GDP was close
to 5%, the highest being 10.49% in 1994, and the lowest being -0.73%
in 1999, the latter explained by the e¤ects of the Asian crisis.
For the analysis, I chose 13 industries that are present in 342 comunas
along the country. Not all industries are present in each comuna. To
have a better idea, Table 1 shows the chosen industries and their presence
in local markets. For the purpose of this paper, only industries with
presence in more than 60% of the comunas are selected.
In order to dene a local market I consider each comuna as an isolated
local market. For that reason, I chose those that were non-metropolitan
areas because in metropolitan areas the relevant market of rms operat-
ing in a comuna is probably determined by many of the comunas around.
In addition, I eliminate all comunas with more than 50,000 people be-
cause it is likely that for some industry there is more than one market in
those comunas. In the end, I keep 198 non-metropolitan comunas with
populations smaller than 50,000 people.
In order to show how heterogeneous the sample is, Table 2 presents
the number of rms by industry and year for the chosen non-metropolitan
local markets.
Given that I observe the universe of rms present in each market,
I construct a Herndahl concentration index (H) by year, industry and
comuna using the sales variable. In order to do this, I assume that, on
average, each rmstotal sales correspond to the midpoint of each tier.
For instance, tier 1 is composed of rms that sell between $1 and $14,999
per year, and I assume that average sales on tier 1 are $7,500. For the
last tier, where rms sell more than $225 million per year, I assume that
the $225 million point is the midpoint between the average sales for tier
11 and the average sales for tier 12. I tried with other rules, but the
main results remained unchanged. In Table 3, it is interesting to check
how heterogeneous industries are in terms of concentration with grocery
stores having a Herndahl index (averaged by comuna) of 0.168 and gas
stations with one of 0.789. We also report the 4-rm concentration ratio,
C4.
which are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: Industries and Presence in Local Markets
Industry CIIU Code Comunas Percent
Gas stations 62536 121 61.1%
Propane stores 62531 133 67.2%
Office supply stores 62547 143 72.2%
Hardware stores 62538 149 75.3%
Clothing stores 62412 151 76.3%
Cold cut stores 62131 162 81.8%
Candy stores 62181 162 81.8%
Butcher’s shops 62121 176 88.9%
Greengrocer’s stores 62161 177 89.4%
Supermarkets 62103 180 90.9%
Liquor stores 62111 180 90.9%
Home supply stores 62524 186 93.9%
Grocery stores 62101 192 97.0%
Total 198 100.0%
Table 2: Number of Firms by Industry and Year
Industry 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Gas stations 239 246 253 256 260 262 255
Propane stores 254 287 313 333 358 380 372
Handcraft shops 214 233 262 287 351 418 439
Hardware stores 442 470 502 524 533 538 545
Office supply stores 430 470 497 524 552 571 581
Butcher shops 1,027 1,010 995 949 917 843 807
Clothing stores 828 885 929 896 888 876 846
Candy stores 644 718 822 882 1,003 1,121 1,185
Cold cut stores 650 734 841 934 1,059 1,140 1,199
Supermarkets 1,885 2,060 2,205 2,323 2,437 2,454 2,473
Liquor stores 2,353 2,468 2,588 2,606 2,687 2,711 2,685
Greengrocer stores 1,936 2,140 2,386 2,533 2,793 2,944 3,015
Home supply stores 3,603 3,992 4,393 4,548 4,879 4,957 4,982
Grocery stores 11,579 11,720 11,795 11,404 11,380 11,037 10,641
Total 25,870 27,200 28,519 28,712 29,746 29,834 29,586
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Table 3: Concentration Indexes by Industry
Industry H C4
Grocery stores 0.168 0.522
Home supply stores 0.331 0.746
Liquor stores 0.382 0.814
Greengrocer stores 0.407 0.812
Supermarkets 0.439 0.863
Butcher shops 0.503 0.923
Cold cut stores 0.537 0.914
Candy stores 0.553 0.923
Clothing stores 0.599 0.926
Office supply stores 0.650 0.966
Hardware stores 0.678 0.981
Propane stores 0.736 0.984
Gas stations 0.789 0.996
In order to measure the size of the market, it would be ideal to know
the population in each comuna, but unfortunately this information is
not available on a yearly basis. As an alternative, I construct a proxy
measure of GDP by comuna, given that GDP is only measured at the
national level. From the same database, for each year, I construct a
variable that consists of the summation of all the retail sales of the rms
in each comuna. Since I have information for all rms operating in the
formal sector this seems like a good proxy for the size of the market.
Information about the average retail sales by industry can be found in
Table 4.
The control variables are obtained from the CASEN Survey that is
one of the very few sources of information that has data at the comuna
level. This survey measures the socioeconomic standard of living in Chile
and it is available every two years. I use the surveys for years 1994,
1996, 1998 and 2000. The variables chosen are: percentage of homes
with running water, percentage of homes with electricity (with a kW
counter), literacy rate, average number of years of schooling, percentage
of the population that had a paid job during last week, and average age.
A summary with the main results taken from this survey can be found
in Appendix 1.
4 Model
This section briey describes a model that relates market size and con-
centration. First, I analyze the case when sunk costs are exogenous and
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Table 4: Average Sales by Comunas: Bottom and Top Ten
Comunas Annual Avg. SalesYear 2000 (USD)*
Bottom ten
General Lagos 4,286
Laguna Blanca 6,857
Colchane 7,450
Timaukel 8,100
Camarones 9,420
Chillan Viejo 9,900
Hualaihue 10,859
Antuco 12,000
Tortel 12,643
San Juan de La Costa 13,160
Top Ten
Santa Cruz 114,634
Limache 116,181
Rio Negro 118,222
Castro 137,665
Coyhaique 157,294
Algarrobo 160,208
Aysen 174,297
Puerto Varas 273,865
Santo Domingo 286,957
Romeral 368,333
* In dollars of year 2000
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where the relationship (negative) between market size and concentration
is the usual one found in most oligopoly models. Then, I analyze the
case where sunk costs are endogenous, and nd that under some gen-
eral conditions, concentration is bounded away from zero no matter how
large the market becomes.
4.1 Exogenous Sunk Costs
In order to keep the algebra simple, I show the case of an isoelastic
demand schedule. All the relevant features remain if any other demand
schedule is used.3
If p denotes price, X the quantity sold and S the total expenditure,
our measure of market size, then
X =
S
p
; (1)
p=
SP
xi
:
Suppose that N rms enter the market at stage 1. At stage 2, rm
is prot is:
i = p
X
xj

xi   cxi (2)
=
SP
xi
xi   cxi (3)
@i
@xi
=
S
P
xi   Sxi
(
P
xi)2
  c = 0 (4)
,
X
xi   c
S
(
X
xi)
2 = xi:
In equilibrium xi = x for all i, then
@
@xi
= 0) x = (N   1)
N2
 S
c
: (5)
Now, using this expression in the demand function, I obtain the price
p = c

1 +
1
N   1

; (6)
and prots
3A more general model can be found in Sutton (1991).
9
 = (p  c)xi (7)
=
S
N2
:
Now, an entrant at stage 1 incurs a sunk cost of F0, so the prots
become:
 =
S
N2
  F0: (8)
There will be entrants until prots are zero, so:
S
N2
  F0 = 0 (9)
) N =
r
S
F0
:
The number of entrants increases monotonically as the size of the
market, relative to the level of setup costs, increases. Hence, a more
fragmented market structure is observed. In other words, there exists a
negative relation between market size (relatively to the setup costs) and
market concentration.
4.2 Endogenous Sunk Costs
In order to include the endogeneity of sunk costs into the model, I need
to consider the possibility of rms producing goods that have di¤erent
perceived qualities (wi). The di¤erent qualities can be achieved with
di¤erent outlays in advertising or R&D at the rst stage.
Let the demand function be dened as:
pi =
Swi
NX
j=1
wjxi
: (10)
The prot function for rm i is:
i = pixi   cxi (11)
=
SwiP
j wjx
xi   cxi:
Solving the rst order conditions I get:
wixi =
X
j
wjxi

1 
P
j wjxi
Swi

; (12)
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and then summing over all products and rearranging, the equilibrium
quantity is:
xi =
S
c
 N   1
wi
P
j(
1
wj
)
"
1  N   1
wi
P
j(
1
wj
)
#
: (13)
Solving now for prices:
pi =

cwi
N   1
X
j
1
wj

: (14)
Plugging xi and pi into the prot function and simplifying, the prot
function becomes:
i = S
"
1  N   1
wi
 1P
j(
1
wj
)
#2
: (15)
With this function I can calculate a threshold level for w (w0) that
makes prots equal to zero and so any rm that chooses to produce with
quality w < w0 will not survive,
S
"
1  N   1
w0
 1P
j(
1
wj
)
#2
= 0; (16)
) the threshold is w0 = N   1P
j(
1
wj
)
: (17)
Therefore, the summation in the prot expression considers the N
rms that produce with quality w  w0:
Let us now consider a 3-stage game where in the rst stage rms
decide whether to enter or not. If they decide to enter they need to pay
a xed cost F0 > 0. At stage 2 they choose the quality level w 2 [1;1)
for an additional xed cost A(w), which makes it the total xed cost
equal to F (w) = F0 + A(w): At the nal stage, rms compete à la
Cournot, taking quality as xed, as solved above. The relevant rm
payo¤ equals:   F (w):
A complete treatment of this model is developed in Sutton (1991), so
here I use some simplications and parameterizations just to show the
theoretical relationship between market size and concentration.
Stage 2 At the second stage of the game, the number of rms are
taken as a parameter (from stage 1) and so at this point all entrants have
already incurred a xed cost F0 and alsoA(w), that is the portion of xed
costs associated with quality. The symmetric Nash equilibrium outcome
takes one of these two forms @i
@wi
jwi= w=1  @F (w)@w jw=1 or @i@wi jwi= w=1 >
@F (w)
@w
jw=1.
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If it is assumed that all rms produce with quality w = 1; then a
rm nds it protable to deviate slightly above w = 1 if and only if
@i
@wi
jwi= w=1 > @F (w)@w jw=1; hence if @i@wi jwi= w=1 
@F (w)
@wi
jw=1 holds, and the
only possible equilibrium is the one I described for the case of exogenous
sunk costs, with no advertising and where every rm o¤ers a common
level of quality at equilibrium. If a rm nds it protable to deviate,
then it must be true that @i
@wi
jwi= w=1 > @F (w)@w jw=1, and so it chooses a
higher value of w until @i
@wi
jwi= w=1 = @F (w)@w jw=1 is reached.
Now, a functional form for F (w) = F0+A(w) is assumed withA(w) =
a

(w 1);where a is a parameter and the convexity of this function is such
that there are diminishing returns from increases in advertising outlays.
This means that higher values of  are associated with more rapidly
diminishing returns.4 Finally, F (w) = F0 + a (w
   1) and @F (w)
@w
jw=1 =

w

F  

F0   a

: Therefore,
@
@w
jw= w=1 = @F (w)
@w
jw=1 (18)
2
S
w
 (N   1)
2
N3
=

w

F  

F0   a


F (N;S) = 2
S

 (N   1)
2
N3
+

F0   a


;
where F (N;S) is the level of xed outlays incurred at equilibrium by
rms as a function of N and S.
Stage 1 The equilibrium structure of the industry is determined
at the rst stage of the game. All rms that enter the market choose
the same level of w with F (N;S) > F0: At stage 1, rms enter until
N =
q
S
F (N;S) .
5
N =
s
S
F (N;S)
(19)
F (N;S) =
S
N2
:
Using expression 1.19 in equation 1.18 and the zero prot condition,
4I assume that  is above some threshold such that it guarantees that we are
looking for a global maximum.
5We will assume N to be a continuous variable to simplify the algebra, but strictly
speaking, we should choose the largest integer that satises N 
q
S
F(N:S)
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an equilibrium is found:
S
N2
= 2
S

 (N   1)
2
N3
+

F0   a


(20)
1 =
2

 (N   1)
2
N
+
N2
S

F0   a


(N   1)2
N
=

2

1  N
2
S

F0   a


=

2
241 

F0   a

F
35 :
This equilibrium in the advertising zone is described by the intersec-
tion of this combination of N and F and the zero prot condition. As
S !1; the above expression is transformed into
(N   1)2
N
=

2
: (21)
The N that solves this implicit function is ~N(=2) and it only de-
pends on :
Next, I analyze the shape of this relation between F and N in order
to nd the possible equilibria:
(N   1)2
N
=

2
241 

F0   a

F
35 (22)
F =

F0   a

1  2(N 1)2
N
:
The slope of this F function is given by:
@F
@N
=

F0   a


1  2(N 1)2
N
2 2(N2   1)N2 (23)
=

F0   a

(+)
(+)
(+)
:
The sign of the slope determines three di¤erent cases:
If F0 =
a

! @F
@N
= 0; (24)
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Conguration when: F0 = a=, (S1 < S2 < S3)
S3/N2
S1/N2
S2/N2
F
F0
Ñ(γ/2)=Ñ(a/2F0)
N
If F0 <
a

! @F
@N
< 0; and (25)
If F0 >
a

! @F
@N
> 0: (26)
4.2.1 Case 1 F0 = a
As Figure 1 shows, the equilibrium can be found in two di¤erent zones.
The rst one, where advertising is not present since the size of the
market is not large enough and where market size increases (to a level
below ~N(=2) = ~N(a=2F0)), implies lower concentration levels. The sec-
ond is a zone where advertising is present no matter how large the market
becomes, the concentration remains the same.
4.2.2 Case 2 F0 < a
As seen in Figure 2, when no advertising is involved, the result is the
same as in case 1 up to ~N(a=2F0), but there is a region between ~N(a=2F0)
and ~N(=2) (with ~N(a=2F0) > ~N(=2)) where the schedule is downward
sloping until it reaches F = F0: As S increases, N rst increases until
it reaches ~N(a=2F0), then after this point, further increases in S will
cause a decrease in N , but asymptotically it goes to the same level as
case 1 (that is, to ~N(=2)). In this case it is worth mentioning that
the relation between market size and concentration is non-monotonic,
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Conguration when: F0 < a=, (S1 < S2 < S3)
S1/N2
S2/N2
S3/N2
N
F
F0
Ñ(γ/2) Ñ(a/2F0)
although concentration remains bounded away from zero as market size
increases.
4.2.3 Case 3 F0 > a
In this case, as shown in Figure 3, when no advertising is present, the
results are the same as case 1 and 2 only until ~N(a=2F0). After this
point, the schedule that relates F and N is upward sloping until ~N(=2)
(for this case ~N(a=2F0) < ~N(=2)). Hence, as S increases the concen-
tration drops, but it is asymptotically bounded by 1~N(=2) ; converging to
the same point as the other two cases.
5 Estimation
In this section, I test the central implications of the theory. I begin test-
ing whether the level of concentration is bounded away from zero when
market size increases in the advertising intensive industries. This is the
approach taken by most empirical work in this area (Ellickson 2007,
Bronnenberg et al. 2005, etc.), since the presence of market heterogene-
ity makes it hard to uncover a clear relationship between concentration
and market size. Nevertheless, since I am using a panel dataset for
the estimation that permits to control for unobserved heterogeneity, I
also estimate the elasticity of concentration on market size. I expect a
negative estimated coe¢ cient for industries where I presume exogenous
sunk costs are involved and one close to zero for advertising-intensive
15
Figure 3: Equilibrium Conguration when: F0 > a=, (S1 < S2 < S3)
N
S1/N2
S2/N2
S3/N2
F0
Ñ(a/2F0) Ñ(γ/2)
industries.
5.1 The Lower Bound to Concentration
Figure 4 shows a scatter plot of the relationship between concentration
and market size. The upper panels are constructed using the Hernd-
ahl concentration index and the lower panels use C4. In both cases a
logit transformation of H is plotted, ln ~H(Sit; Xit)=ln

Hit
1 Hit

,6 to avoid
the problem that both measures of concentration are constrained to lie
between zero and one.7 The left panels show information about home
supply stores, an industry I presume relates closely to the model of ex-
ogenous sunk costs because of the low level of advertising that is usually
involved. The right panels present the information for supermarkets
which, on the contrary, I presume belong to the group of advertising-
intensive industries which behave like Sutton predicted in his model of
endogenous sunk costs.
The estimation of a lower bound for each plot is performed following
Sutton (1991). I assume that the measure of concentration is generated
6Or ln
~
C4(Sit; Xit)=ln

C4it
1 C4it

for the case of the C4 concentration index.
7Because of the logit transformation, the Herndahl Index and the C4s maximum
value are set equal to 0.99.
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Figure 4: Concentration and Market Size
by an extreme value Weibull distribution that can be estimated by a two-
step approach proposed by Smith (1985, 1994), given that the maximum
likelihood estimation does not work for some ranges of parameters of
the Weibull.8 In order to parameterize the lower bound, Sutton suggests
estimating:
~Cn = a+
b
ln(S)
+ "i ("i > 0); (27)
where ~Cn is a measure of concentration and the residuals "i are distrib-
uted as a two parameter Weibull (" Weibull(; s)). Then,
F (") = 1  e(  "s)

: (28)
On a rst step, the parameters a and b are estimated by the simplex
method, solving:
min
a;b
nX
i=1

log

Hi
1 Hi

 

a+
b
ln(Si)

(29)
8As Sutton (1991) estates "For 1 <   2, a local maximum of the likelihood
function extist, but it does not have the usual asymptotic properties; for 0    1,
no local maximum of likelihood function exist."
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Figure 5: Lower Bound Estimations in Supermarket and Home Supply
Industry
s.t.
log

Hi
1 Hi



a+
b
ln(Si)

:
Then, assuming " Weibull(; s); on a second step I estimate the two
other parameters,  and s; by maximizing the pseudo-likelihood that was
constructed by substituting the value of the estimated residuals obtained
in the rst step,
max
;s
nX
i=1
log


s
"^
( 1)
i exp

  "^

i
s

: (30)
The results obtained using the described procedure can be seen in
Figure 5. At rst sight the results are not that promising since both
industries show that concentration will go to zero as market size in-
creases. Nevertheless, the lack of di¤erence is due to the presence of
outliers. As Robinson and Chiang (1996), Giorgetti (2003) and Rosende
(2008) state, a lower bound function can be strongly inuenced by even
a single outlier. In a sample of 1,224 observations it is not surprising
that a few outliers distort the analysis. Following Robinson and Chiang
(1996) I delete 1% of the sample that has the smallest market size and
1% of the sample that has the lowest level of concentration. This simple
guideline was enough to remove a few obvious outliers but was harmless
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Figure 6: Lower Bounds in Supermarket and Home Supply Industry
(without outliers)
Table 5: Lower Bounds Estimation by Industry using Herndahl
Industry a b α s Asymptotic H% Number of
Obsevations
Clothing stores -9.88 91.47 1.56 8.22 0.01 943
Cold cut stores -9.19 79.28 1.63 8.13 0.01 1,024
Liquor stores -7.99 57.26 1.74 6.74 0.03 1,228
Home supply stores -7.65 48.20 1.73 7.10 0.05 1,263
Grocery stores -7.48 42.55 1.56 2.96 0.06 1,335
Candy stores -7.34 62.24 1.51 6.14 0.06 950
Greengrocer stores -6.80 43.79 1.53 5.77 0.11 1,155
Butcher shops -6.63 51.33 1.46 4.79 0.13 1,142
Office supply stores -6.19 57.13 1.29 4.43 0.20 903
Handcraft shops -5.48 36.23 1.63 13.22 0.42 618
Hardware stores -5.37 46.56 1.50 6.29 0.46 965
Gas stations -4.79 48.63 1.48 6.77 0.82 760
Supermarkets (wo) -2.49 3.48 1.21 2.79 7.67 1,214
Propane stores -1.96 3.00 1.54 8.77 12.36 811
enough to keep 98% of the data for the lower bound estimation. In fact,
re-estimating and considering the criteria explained above, I obtain the
di¤erences that conrm Suttons pattern, as seen in Figure 6 and Table
5. I repeat this procedure for some other industries, but in these cases
the results change very little compared to when I do not eliminate the
outliers.
The estimates show a limiting concentration close to 0 for all in-
dustries but supermarkets (without outliers) and propane stores9, with
9The propane industry in Chile is composed of retailers of propane bottles. Each
one of these retailers buys from only one of the three rms in charge of lling and dis-
tributing the bottles throughout the whole country. Concentration is bounded above
zero, but in this case, endogenous sunk costs are probably not a good explanation.
Instead, a particularity of this industry gives a better intuition. The rms in charge
of the distribution have the incentive to allow for retailers to grow (up to an optimal
scale) as market size increases (instead of letting new retailers in the market) since
there are transportation, logistics, and paperwork costs associated with each new
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limiting concentrations of around 8% and 12%, respectively. The es-
timated values for the parameter  range between 1 and 2, justifying
the use of the method proposed by Smith (1994). Results for C4 are
presented in the Appendix.
5.2 The Elasticity of Concentration on Market Size
In this section I report the results of estimating the following linear
regression equation by industry:10
lnH(Sit; Xit) = 0 + 1 lnSit + 2 lnXit + "it; (31)
where lnHit is the natural logarithm of the Herndahl index in the co-
muna i and year t; lnSit is the natural logarithm of the market size
measured by the summation of sales for all rms in market i during year
t; the control variable lnXit corresponds to the natural logarithm of the
socioeconomic variables from the CASEN survey for comuna i and year
t. Additionally, since H is bounded by 0 and 1, this linear specication
might be inappropriate, and therefore I also run the test using a logit
transformation like the one used for the estimation of the lower bounds,
where the domain of the transformed variable changes from [0,1] to the
real line. I also repeat these regressions for a di¤erent measure of con-
centration, C4, and the results are reported in the Appendix.
An alternative to this model uses, as the dependant variable, aver-
age sales, as Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) did. They nd that in
most retail industries analyzed, establishments are larger in larger cities.
Unfortunately, they cannot identify if the predominant e¤ect has to do
with total sales or with the number of rms in the market. On the other
hand, if I use the number of rms as the dependent variable, I am not
able to identify what happens to the sales of those rms. Using a con-
centration index, instead, allows us to have a more conclusive result as
it considers both e¤ects.
The results obtained using the described procedure can be seen in
Table 7. The number of observations used in the regressions are pre-
sented in Table 6. I begin by considering the results of a linear regression
(pooled OLS) and nd that the estimated coe¢ cient for the variable of
interest (elasticity of concentration with respect to market size) is nega-
store. If the market is large enough, then the same rm in charge of the distribution
can install a store and act as a retailer. In this case, given the characteristics of the
database, it is not possible to observe the retail stores belonging to one of the three
rms in charge of the distribution since the ID will be the same for all the rms
activities.
10Doing the regressions industry by industry allows us to ignore the setup costs in
the estimation since we can assume that they are the same for all incumbent rms.
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tive and signicantly di¤erent from zero (at a 99% condence level) for
12 out of 13 industries. These industries are presumed to have a small
component of sunk costs since advertising (or R&D) is not usually seen.
For these industries, for instance in home supply stores, greengrocer
stores and o¢ ce supply stores among others, I nd that the estimated
elasticity is the most negative, a result that is in line with the one pre-
dicted by the model with exogenous sunk costs (as market size increases
the concentration decreases steadily).
Nevertheless there is one industry, supermarkets, where the elasticity
coe¢ cient is pretty close to zero, or not statistically di¤erent from zero
at the 5% level. For this industry, the results behave in a fashion like
the one predicted by Sutton (1991), indicating that, no matter how big
the market becomes, the concentration index changes very little and it is
bounded away from zero. One explanation for this result would be that
rms in the supermarket industry tend to invest more in advertising, and
this investment will improve their position in order to compete on prices
as market size increases. Nevertheless, in this case, the supermarket
industry is composed of small single-unit rms in markets belonging to
non-metropolitan areas where probably advertising expenditures are not
very common especially those incurred as a sunk xed cost. In this case,
probably Ellicksons (2007) explanation might be better suited, where
investment in land allows rms to o¤er, in the future, a larger variety of
products as market size increases, making entry less attractive to other
rms and keeping concentration bounded above zero.
Next, I estimate the regressions again, industry by industry, but us-
ing a Panel data model (random e¤ect) that controls for unobserved
heterogeneity, since ignoring this might bias the results presented ear-
lier. The coe¢ cient of the elasticity for this case is again negative and
signicantly di¤erent from zero (at a 99% condence level) for 12 out
of 13 industries. Although the coe¢ cients change, supermarkets still
behave according to the model of endogenous sunk costs and results are
even stronger, conrming the results commented upon earlier.
I also estimate the OLS and Panel R.E. models without the con-
trol variables and most of the results still hold, as the estimates and
their statistical signicance change very little. For supermarkets, the
coe¢ cient continues to be the lowest of all industries but it is di¤erent
from zero at 99% condence. The inclusion of these variables results in
added explanatory power but only slightly changes the estimated e¤ect
of market size on concentration.
Finally, I repeat all regressions for the logit transformation of the
Herndahl and this time the coe¢ cient on the market size variable is no
longer statistically zero. Nevertheless, the coe¢ cient for the supermar-
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Table 6: Number of Observations for the Regressions
Industry
Number of Observations for
regressions with control
Variables
Number of Observations for
regressions without control
Variables
Home Supply Stores 496 1263
Office Supply Stores 392 903
Clothes Stores 381 943
Grocery Stores 509 1335
Cold Cuts 420 1024
Hardware Stores 388 965
Candy Stores 415 950
Gas Stations 323 760
Liquor Stores 489 1228
Butcher’s Shops 454 1142
Greengrocer’s Stores 384 877
Propane Stores 342 811
Supermarkets 475 1238
ketsregression is the closest to zero of all industries, being close to -0.3
for all the specications. The estimation results for C4 can be found in
the Appendix.
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Table 7: Regressions of Concentration Ratios (H) on Market Size
See Table 1.6 for the number of observations.
All Coefficients significant at 1% level.
*   Significant at the 10% level.
+ Not statistically significant.
Panel R.E
(over Comunas)
Pooled OLS Panel R.E.
no control Var.
Pooled OLS
no control Var.
Home supply stores
-0.494
(0.032)
-0.507
(0.026)
-0.355
(0.022)
-0.428
(0.013)
Office supply stores
-0.342
(0.027)
-0.338
(0.022)
-0.289
(0.021)
-0.290
(0.012)
Clothing stores
-0.293
(0.034)
-0.315
(0.026)
-0.247
(0.025)
-0.293
(0.015)
Grocery stores -0.281
(0.031)
-0.306
(0.027)
-0.199
(0.022)
-0.327
(0.013)
Cold cut stores -0.265
(0.034)
-0.269
(0.027)
-0.229
(0.024)
-0.253
(0.015)
Hardware stores -0.245
(0.026)
-0.265
(0.020)
-0.196
(0.019)
-0.242
(0.011)
Candy stores -0.234
(0.027)
-0.247
(0.023)
-0.272
(0.021)
-0.296
(0.014)
Gas stations -0.229
(0.025)
-0.250
(0.020)
-0.168
(0.019)
-0.199
(0.011)
Liquor stores -0.222
(0.033)
-0.316
(0.026)
-0.162
(0.024)
-0.281
(0.014)
Butcher shops -0.207
(0.031)
-0.243
(0.025)
-0.128
(0.020)
-0.198
(0.012)
Greengrocer stores
-0.194
(0.039)
-0.226
(0.031)
-0.188
(0.029)
-0.238
(0.017)
Propane stores -0.112
(0.029)
-0.137
(0.025)
-0.112
(0.022)
-0.130
(0.013)
Supermarkets
-0.040+
(0.035)
-0.051*
(0.027)
-0.070
(0.023)
-0.099
(0.014)
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Table 8: Regressions of Concentration Ratios (H) on Market Size (Logit
Transformation)
Panel R.E
(over Comunas)
Pooled OLS Panel R.E.
no control Var.
Pooled OLS
no control Var.
Home supply stores
-1.177
(0.093)
-1.116
(0.070)
-0.971
(0.069)
-1.098
(0.038)
Office supply stores
-1.891
(0.164)
-1.885
(0.131)
-1.709
(0.127)
-1.732
(0.073)
Clothing stores
-1.412
(0.173)
-1.435
(0.126)
-1.146
(0.135)
-1.405
(0.076)
Grocery stores -0.487
(0.048)
-0.463
(0.038)
-0.386
(0.043)
-0.694
(0.025)
Cold cut stores -1.209
(0.152)
-1.173
(0.117)
-1.076
(0.118)
-1.112
(0.069)
Hardware stores -1.466
(0.167)
-1.641
(0.124)
-1.311
(0.126)
-1.488
(0.074)
Candy stores -1.144
(0.137)
-1.168
(0.110)
-1.478
(0.111)
-1.517
(0.070)
Gas stations -1.653
(0.198)
-1.704
(0.163)
-1.325
(0.151)
-1.558
(0.091)
Liquor stores -0.459
(0.085)
-0.765
(0.068)
-0.482
(0.069)
-0.752
(0.043)
Butcher shops -0.744
(0.133)
-0.985
(0.107)
-0.533
(0.085)
-0.909
(0.054)
Greengrocer stores
-0.746
(0.167)
-0.685
(0.131)
-0.924
(0.130)
-0.914
(0.079)
Propane stores -0.963
(0.203)
-1.114
(0.163)
-0.911
(0.156)
-1.065
(0.087)
Supermarkets
-0.300*
(0.111)
-0.265**
(0.086)
-0.341
(0.076)
-0.442
(0.047)
See Table 1.6 for the number of observations.
All Coefficients significant at 1% level.
*   Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
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6 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to present empirical evidence of Suttons
hypothesis of endogenous sunk costs. I present the estimations of lower
bounds to show that concentration is bounded away from zero for su-
permarkets, an industry that I presume has an important component of
endogenous sunk costs. I complement these results with the estima-
tion of the elasticity of concentration with respect to market size, being
able to control for unobserved heterogeneity captured by R.E. estima-
tions, providing more evidence to Suttons hypothesis. The nature of
these results can be explained by investment in advertising in the initial
stages or an alternative explanation proposed by Ellickson (2007), which
is investment in land and/or distribution centers. This investment al-
lows rms to o¤er, in the future, a larger variety of products as market
size increases, making entry less attractive to other rms and keeping
concentration bounded above zero. The idea of distribution centers
probably does not apply since the supermarket industry I analyze here
is an industry of small single-plant supermarkets in local markets so the
scale is not enough to make the investment in sophisticated distribution
centers protable.
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Table 9: Socieconomic Information by Comuna from the CASEN survey
Comuna
% of Homes with
Electricity (with
kW counter)
% of Homes
with Running
Water
%  Population
with a Paid Job
(last week)
Literacy Rate Years ofSchooling
Camarones 10.5 21.5 67.0 84.2 6.4
Camina. 14.4 76.8 62.4 89.3 6.3
General Lagos 15.0 30.0 60.6 71.8 4.8
Colchane 15.8 61.1 39.1 76.9 5.5
Quinchao 36.2 26.6 48.6 94.1 7.4
Canela 37.1 29.9 34.3 83.9 6.0
Huara 37.1 47.3 55.8 90.8 7.2
Quemchi 43.8 22.4 50.0 91.2 6.6
Contulmo 46.8 25.7 40.2 83.6 5.5
Los Sauces 50.9 23.7 41.0 82.7 5.6
San Pedro De Atacama 51.0 80.1 49.8 88.3 7.0
Mariquina 51.1 43.0 38.3 88.3 6.8
Chonchi 51.6 18.7 43.7 90.1 6.2
Lonquimay 52.1 32.4 39.7 86.8 6.3
Tirua 56.7 36.8 36.8 84.6 6.1
Chile Chico 58.8 58.0 55.1 83.7 5.3
Hualaihue 61.4 27.6 42.2 91.5 6.9
Lumaco 62.0 32.2 37.3 83.4 6.1
Curaco De Velez 63.4 26.6 44.0 89.8 6.8
Collipulli 66.0 55.9 37.5 86.5 6.7
Putre 66.3 72.5 64.1 81.9 6.5
Santa Barbara 69.0 22.9 39.3 87.1 6.5
San Juan De La Costa 69.1 8.0 44.4 89.1 6.3
Punitaqui 69.2 30.6 36.7 88.4 6.6
La Higuera 69.3 49.2 46.6 84.3 5.9
Quilaco 69.8 35.9 30.2 86.7 6.2
Los Muermos 71.5 19.5 46.9 89.2 6.2
Calbuco 72.6 39.8 44.3 93.8 7.0
Fresia 74.0 22.6 47.5 91.3 6.9
Porvenir 74.0 71.9 53.0 97.7 8.5
Dalcahue 75.1 27.8 50.9 90.9 6.8
Los Lagos 76.3 10.4 36.7 88.6 6.5
Rio Ibañez 77.1 74.4 51.0 86.5 6.4
Rio Hurtado 77.4 70.0 42.6 86.9 6.2
Panguipulli 77.8 46.5 33.6 94.0 7.6
San Fabian 77.8 45.0 39.2 81.3 6.2
Combarbala 78.4 68.1 39.1 88.6 7.1
Cochamo 80.4 60.8 46.6 92.5 7.2
Santa Cruz 82.1 61.0 43.5 88.4 7.5
El Carmen 82.1 13.9 37.5 86.7 6.4
Puerto Octay 82.3 18.9 47.1 91.6 6.7
Ancud 82.4 63.9 46.9 93.6 7.8
Taltal 82.7 74.6 43.7 95.8 8.5
Maullin 83.1 59.8 48.3 92.8 7.3
Puerto Natales 83.5 72.6 51.5 94.8 7.7
Portezuelo 83.5 38.0 30.3 79.8 6.0
Lago Ranco 84.0 36.9 32.7 90.9 7.0
Ercilla 84.2 53.5 39.4 85.0 6.2
Paillaco 84.7 39.0 34.9 83.7 6.2
San Ignacio 84.9 47.3 33.8 86.6 6.4
Mulchen 85.3 69.6 37.2 90.0 7.0
Chepica 85.6 72.4 40.8 85.7 6.9
Coyhaique 85.8 83.8 50.4 92.7 8.2
Trehuaco 86.0 34.6 34.9 81.6 5.7
La Union 86.1 68.2 38.5 92.8 7.8
Sierra Gorda 86.2 99.0 49.5 96.3 8.7
Los Vilos 86.3 84.3 43.4 93.3 8.0
Cañete 86.6 67.3 36.0 87.0 7.1
Petorca 86.7 84.7 35.9 89.9 7.4
Comuna
% of Homes with
Electricity (with
kW counter)
% of Homes
with Running
Water
%  Population
with a Paid Job
(last week)
Literacy Rate Years ofSchooling
Victoria 87.2 65.4 38.1 90.1 7.5
Rauco 87.3 43.3 44.9 85.0 6.3
Nacimiento 87.5 79.4 36.9 89.6 8.0
Cisnes 87.5 88.0 53.3 91.6 7.1
Pelluhue 87.9 54.4 39.4 78.6 6.1
Cobquecura 88.0 45.5 42.7 85.6 6.7
San Pablo 88.2 27.8 32.5 89.6 6.7
Illapel 88.2 72.2 37.9 90.1 7.9
Ninhue 88.3 24.4 34.7 78.3 5.5
Vichuquen 88.4 52.2 44.2 87.8 6.7
Quilleco 88.8 50.7 36.3 88.2 6.4
Pozo Almonte 89.0 85.7 45.6 87.6 8.3
Pichilemu 89.3 74.8 39.2 88.7 7.6
Tierra Amarilla 89.3 69.1 53.7 94.5 8.0
Freirina 89.4 79.2 39.8 93.1 7.8
Alto Del Carmen 89.4 53.9 50.6 85.3 6.2
Monte Patria 89.5 70.2 49.2 89.0 6.8
Chanco 89.7 57.2 43.5 87.7 6.5
Retiro 89.8 53.9 40.9 84.9 6.0
Caldera 90.1 90.3 50.2 96.7 9.3
Ranquil 90.3 65.1 35.1 87.5 6.6
Pemuco 90.4 52.0 38.4 87.7 6.4
Licanten 90.5 80.2 43.6 86.8 7.2
Hualañe 90.5 67.1 41.8 86.6 6.9
Cauquenes 90.7 72.7 38.1 89.8 7.3
Lebu 90.8 84.3 36.6 90.1 7.9
Traiguen 91.3 79.8 39.9 89.2 7.8
Longavi 91.3 45.1 44.6 86.8 6.2
San Nicolas 91.6 24.2 36.8 84.4 6.3
Sagrada Familia 91.7 81.6 45.4 85.6 6.4
Bulnes 91.7 66.3 39.6 87.5 7.2
Puren 91.8 88.0 36.9 92.5 7.9
Coelemu 91.9 67.7 38.8 87.5 6.7
Antuco 92.0 68.8 31.5 90.2 6.9
Paihuano 92.1 56.2 50.6 93.7 7.6
San Carlos 92.2 66.8 43.8 87.7 7.4
Lolol 92.4 9.6 36.4 76.0 5.3
Tucapel 92.4 80.1 36.7 91.0 7.1
Los Alamos 92.4 63.6 38.3 89.5 7.6
Salamanca 92.5 89.4 39.9 88.4 6.9
Puerto Varas 92.5 73.6 46.8 93.0 8.5
Quillon 92.8 27.6 35.4 82.2 6.2
Futrono 93.0 64.1 43.5 93.2 7.3
San Gregorio De Ñiquen 93.2 37.4 38.1 86.0 6.1
Huasco 93.2 91.8 40.8 96.3 9.1
Arauco 93.3 68.5 38.4 91.8 8.0
Aysen 93.4 76.9 50.2 93.2 7.7
San Javier 93.6 63.1 41.4 86.5 7.2
Catemu 93.7 84.0 42.4 90.5 7.5
Pinto 93.7 58.4 37.0 88.7 7.1
Angol 93.9 89.4 42.0 91.3 8.5
Paredones 93.9 56.0 39.7 80.8 6.1
Chanaral 94.0 97.1 41.3 95.1 8.6
Vicuña 94.0 77.5 49.4 92.1 7.7
San Rosendo 94.1 85.9 30.3 92.3 7.8
Santo Domingo 94.3 56.9 43.9 93.9 8.6
Parral 94.3 72.4 44.3 90.1 7.7
Coihueco 94.3 53.2 41.3 86.3 6.5
La Estrella 94.3 33.3 40.8 86.5 6.4
34
Comuna
% of Homes with
Electricity (with
kW counter)
% of Homes
with Running
Water
%  Population
with a Paid Job
(last week)
Literacy Rate Years ofSchooling
Rio Bueno 94.4 54.1 38.3 92.1 7.3
Castro 94.5 84.4 53.1 97.0 9.0
Tocopilla 94.7 94.9 40.2 98.4 9.3
Yungay 94.8 81.7 38.5 91.5 7.8
Curanilahue 94.8 89.9 34.2 90.0 7.6
Litueche 94.9 47.5 39.4 84.7 7.3
Yumbel 95.1 64.7 32.7 88.0 6.9
Colbun 95.2 83.2 42.3 91.3 7.3
Peralillo 95.2 93.5 39.8 89.4 7.7
Llay-Llay 95.4 88.4 45.8 94.4 8.5
Cabrero 95.5 76.7 38.3 90.1 7.3
Romeral 95.5 73.4 52.9 88.9 7.1
Curacautin 95.7 92.3 39.5 92.3 8.1
Laja 95.9 73.6 35.4 90.5 8.4
Andacollo 96.1 92.9 38.7 91.7 7.5
Quirihue 96.1 85.2 40.9 89.7 8.0
Hijuelas 96.2 72.3 48.6 91.0 7.3
Yerbas Buenas 96.3 69.4 48.2 88.0 6.7
Cartagena 96.4 93.8 40.4 96.0 8.5
Molina 96.8 83.5 45.0 90.8 7.8
Algarrobo 96.8 74.7 46.2 93.0 7.9
La Ligua 97.0 91.0 47.8 92.7 8.3
Negrete 97.3 78.3 37.6 88.9 7.2
Chimbarongo 97.4 81.7 46.1 90.6 7.2
Teno 97.5 68.7 48.5 85.8 6.6
Chillan Viejo 97.5 88.0 41.4 93.6 8.7
Cabildo 97.5 95.2 43.2 91.3 7.7
Vallenar 97.6 89.0 41.1 95.2 9.0
Lanco 97.7 69.8 35.6 92.9 8.2
Olmue 97.7 58.6 41.5 95.6 8.5
Mejillones 97.8 97.0 45.8 98.7 9.5
Diego De Almagro 97.8 92.6 44.2 95.4 9.1
Pica 97.8 95.6 49.0 97.7 8.8
Marchigue 97.9 64.5 43.9 87.6 6.9
Renaico 98.3 85.4 34.7 92.0 7.4
La Cruz 98.3 78.4 50.0 96.0 8.4
Villa Alegre 98.4 80.5 41.2 90.4 8.0
Calle Larga 98.4 89.6 44.5 93.4 7.9
Rinconada 98.5 94.6 47.8 92.5 8.1
Llanquihue 98.5 97.5 46.6 93.6 7.4
San Esteban 98.5 86.6 45.1 92.0 8.1
Maria Elena 98.6 99.8 47.4 98.9 10.0
Zapallar 98.6 74.6 47.4 92.9 8.0
Purranque 98.7 88.8 38.7 91.3 7.7
Placilla 98.7 82.6 42.7 89.2 7.3
Putaendo 98.8 91.3 41.8 90.3 8.1
Rio Negro 98.9 100.0 35.3 89.6 8.0
Nancagua 99.0 90.6 47.8 90.7 7.6
Limache 99.0 92.1 44.2 96.0 9.4
Navidad 99.1 47.3 40.2 88.6 7.4
Nogales 99.1 86.1 41.6 94.5 8.4
Santa Maria 99.1 92.1 45.4 91.6 8.0
La Calera 99.2 95.0 45.0 96.1 8.9
Frutillar 99.2 77.8 44.5 93.4 8.1
Papudo 99.3 92.0 44.8 94.6 7.9
El Quisco 99.5 89.5 44.3 96.7 8.5
El Tabo 99.5 85.0 41.4 98.1 9.2
Panquehue 99.7 86.6 46.8 92.0 7.8
Cochrane 99.8 99.5 43.2 87.6 7.5
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Table 10: Lower Bound Estimation by Industry using C4
Industry a b α s Asymptotic C4% Number of
Obsevations
Hardware stores -10.26 140.59 2.67 21.82 0.00 965
Candy stores -9.37 113.16 2.59 31.52 0.01 950
Cold cut stores -6.91 79.47 2.61 40.31 0.10 1,024
Gas stations -6.41 105.03 3.20 22.25 0.16 760
Butcher shops -5.68 61.58 2.94 67.31 0.34 1,142
Clothing stores -5.60 65.22 2.78 50.95 0.37 943
Home supply stores -5.35 45.80 1.88 10.53 0.47 1,263
Liquor stores -5.17 48.44 2.11 16.34 0.56 1,228
Grocery stores -4.67 33.79 1.71 3.95 0.93 1,335
Greengrocer stores -4.41 41.48 1.85 11.05 1.20 1,155
Handcraft shops -3.35 34.27 3.37 211.72 3.40 618
Office supply stores -2.16 35.80 2.57 23.37 10.33 903
Propane stores -1.58 24.75 5.20 1393.10 17.13 811
Supermarkets -1.33 14.86 1.65 6.70 20.99 1,214
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Table 11: Regressions of Concentration Ratios (C4) on Market Size
Panel R.E
(over Comunas)
Pooled OLS Panel R.E.
no control Var.
Pooled OLS
no control Var.
Home supply stores
-0.213
(0.014)
-0.228
(0.012)
-0.147
(0.010)
-0.182
(0.006)
Office supply stores
-0.049
(0.005)
-0.044
(0.004)
-0.038
(0.004)
-0.035
(0.002)
Clothing stores
-0.066
(0.009)
-0.076
(0.008)
-0.050
(0.007)
-0.068
(0.004)
Grocery stores -0.149
(0.017)
-0.168
(0.014)
-0.110
(0.012)
-0.162
(0.007)
Cold cut stores -0.060
(0.011)
-0.064
(0.009)
-0.049
(0.007)
-0.060
(0.004)
Hardware stores -0.019
(0.003)
-0.019
(0.002)
-0.013
(0.002)
-0.018
(0.001)
Candy stores -0.054
(0.008)
-0.054
(0.007)
-0.054
(0.006)
-0.060
(0.004)
Gas stations -0.006**
(0.002)
-0.008
(0.001)
-0.004
(0.001)
-0.006
(0.001)
Liquor stores -0.094
(0.012)
-0.120
(0.010)
-0.067
(0.009)
-0.102
(0.005)
Butcher shops -0.058
(0.009)
-0.068
(0.007)
-0.034
(0.006)
-0.049
(0.003)
Greengrocer stores
-0.057
(0.012)
-0.079
(0.010)
-0.049
(0.009)
-0.069
(0.005)
Propane stores -0.008*
(0.004)
-0.009+
(0.004)
-0.009
(0.003)
-0.011
(0.002)
Supermarkets
-0.018+
(0.012)
-0.025*
(0.009)
-0.019
(0.007)
-0.035
(0.004)
See Table 1.6 for the number of observations.
All Coefficients significant at 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*   Significant at the 10% level.
+ Not statistically significant.
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Table 12: Regressions of Concentration Ratios (C4) on Market Size
(Logit Transformation)
Panel R.E
(over Comunas)
Pooled OLS Panel R.E.
no control Var.
Pooled OLS
no control Var.
Home supply stores
-1.379
(0.086)
-1.296
(0.068)
-1.184
(0.063)
-1.272
(0.038)
Office supply stores
-1.312
(0.113)
-1.329
(0.089)
-0.989
(0.086)
-1.070
(0.048)
Clothing stores
-1.309
(0.122)
-1.404
(0.096)
-1.049
(0.092)
-1.224
(0.053)
Grocery stores -0.529
(0.049)
-0.584
(0.040)
-0.243
(0.041)
-0.752
(0.025)
Cold cut stores -1.086
(0.126)
-1.115
(0.102)
-0.962
(0.090)
-1.087
(0.057)
Hardware stores -0.860
(0.097)
-0.961
(0.078)
-0.583
(0.070)
-0.890
(0.042)
Candy stores -1.199
(0.107)
-1.234
(0.089)
-1.157
(0.084)
-1.306
(0.055)
Gas stations -0.415
(0.072)
-0.548
(0.058)
-0.246
(0.049)
-0.404
(0.029)
Liquor stores -0.994
(0.100)
-1.338
(0.078)
-0.767
(0.077)
-1.177
(0.047)
Butcher shops -0.934
(0.116)
-1.165
(0.094)
-0.650
(0.079)
-0.871
(0.047)
Greengrocer stores
-0.734
(0.144)
-0.901
(0.114)
-0.693
(0.106)
-0.908
(0.062)
Propane stores -0.353
(0.103)
-0.453
(0.091)
-0.288
(0.077)
-0.392
(0.044)
Supermarkets
-0.491
(0.123)
-0.458
(0.099)
-0.430
(0.077)
-0.600
(0.051)
See Table 1.6 for the number of observations.
All Coefficients significant at 1% level.
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